I am a visiting lecturer in the philosophy department at Washington University in St. Louis.
I received my PhD in April 2015 from the University of Pittsburgh.
My research is primarily on Kant and the History of Analytic Philosophy. I have secondary interests in Philosophical Logic, Ancient Philosophy, 19th Century German Philosophy, and Philosophy of Mind.
My two main research projects are:
1) Logicism and the Nature of Logic’s Laws in Kant and Frege
There is some dispute over whether Kant and Frege share enough of a conception of logic to allow for fruitful adjudication of the dispute over logicism—the reduction of arithmetic to logic. John MacFarlane argues there is, while Hao Wang (in the spirit of Poincaré) takes their conceptions of logic to be simply too different. In examining this issue more closely, I am working out new readings of both Kant and Frege on the question of what makes a candidate law count as logical. I am also investigating what exactly made logicism look promising to Frege, while it didn’t to Kant, as well as examining the different senses in which they each took logic to be a completely general science of thought. Ultimately, I doubt that Kant and Frege share enough of a conception of logic for fruitful adjudication of the dispute, but if they did, arithmetic would look synthetic rather than analytic.
2) Kant on the Constitution of Experience
Because Kant’s metaphysics of nature largely proceeds by reflecting on how experience (Erfahrung) is possible, understanding his conception of it is critical. In this project I am examining how the two main elements in experience—intuitions and concepts—themselves arise, and then combine in experience. This involves developing an account of how Kant thinks, in general, the intuitions and concepts involved in experience are generated, as well as looking at how these get their objectivity, in virtue of their grounding in a priori representations, like those of space, time, substance, or cause. Ultimately, I think Kant maintains that self-conscious rational minds can have a priori knowledge while merely conscious animal minds cannot, that this is critical to the difference between how each represent empirical objects, and that this insight should still have its place today.
For a fuller description of these projects, and of some essays I'm working on, please e-mail me.
“Definitions of Kant’s Categories.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Supplemental Volume on Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. 2014. 44 (5 – 6): 631 – 657. (2014) Print version.
"Modeling Unicorns and Dead Cats: Applying Bressan's MLν to the Necessary Properties of Non-existent Objects." Journal of Philosophical Logic. (2017). Print version.
“The Display Problem Revisited.” Logica Yearbook 2010. College Publications. 143 – 157.