I am a visiting lecturer in the philosophy department at Washington University in St. Louis.
I received my PhD in April 2015 from the University of Pittsburgh.
“Logical Mistakes, Logical Aliens, and the Laws of Kant's Pure General Logic”
"Modeling Unicorns and Dead Cats: Applying Bressan's MLν to the Necessary Properties of Non-existent Objects." Journal of Philosophical Logic. (2018) Print version.
“Definitions of Kant’s Categories.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Supplemental Volume on Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. 2014. 44 (5 – 6): 631 – 657. (2014) Print version.
My research is primarily on Kant and the History of Analytic Philosophy. I have secondary interests in Philosophical Logic, Ancient Philosophy, 19th Century German Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and Environmental Ethics.
My two main research projects are:
1) Kant on the Nature of Logic
Kant's core innovation in logic is to reject an 'ontological' conception of logic in favor of a 'formalist' one. Logic, on an ontological conception, is descriptive of some domain of actual or possible entities---e.g. all possible worlds. In contrast, logic on a formalist conception studies the form of coherent thought. To violate its laws is to be confused. Such confusion, unlike my false judgment about where my keys are, does not indicate an alternative way things might have been. Because there is no fact that the laws of logic rule out, the formalist holds logical laws are unlike descriptive truths. In this body of work I am investigating Kant’s formalist conceptions of pure general and transcendental logic, and the ramifications of this formalism for his notions of logical and metaphysical necessity.
2) Kant on the Constitution of Experience
One of Kant’s core questions is how knowledge of empirical objects is possible. He holds such knowledge begins with experience, and that the objectivity of experience stems from its grounding in a priori representations like space, time, substance, and cause. In this project I am examining how the two main elements in experience—intuitions and concepts—themselves arise, and then combine in experience. This involves developing an account of how Kant thinks, in general, the intuitions and concepts involved in experience are generated, and how these get their objectivity, in virtue of their grounding in a priori representations.
For a fuller description of these projects, and of some essays in each body of work, please e-mail me.